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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
MARKET VALUATION, PENSION FUND POLICY AND CONTRIBUTION
VOLATILITY∗∗∗∗
Summary
Market valuation is becoming more and more popular, both in accounting and regulation, as
well as in academic circles. For pension funds and their participants, the knowledge that market-
valued pension liabilities can indeed be transferred to a third party, if necessary, is a great virtue.
Using a simulation model, this paper demonstrates the implicit costs and benefits of using market
valuation for a typical Dutch pension fund, which offers a guaranteed average pay nominal pen-
sion with conditional indexation. The impact turns out to be fairly small, if fixed discount rates
are still used for conditional rights. However, if market valuation is used for both unconditional
and conditional rights, contribution volatility increases significantly. A remedy is to increase the
duration of assets considerably. It is not clear, though, whether this option is available for large
pension funds given the limited supply of long-term bonds.
Key words: asset and liability management, conditional indexation, defined benefit pension funds,
fair value versus actuarial discounting, Monte Carlo simulation, pension liabilities
JEL classification: G23, C15, C59, J18
1 INTRODUCTION
New rules in financial accounting (IFRS, Basel II, and Solvency II) require
the use of market prices in the valuation of financial assets and liabili-
ties of listed companies and financial institutions (marking-to-market). In
the Netherlands, market valuation of pension liabilities has become regula-
tory practice as of 2007 onwards. Until recently, the traditional method of
discounting in the Netherlands used a fixed actuarial interest rate, in which
the maximum permitted rate was prescribed by the supervisory authority.
This maximum permitted actuarial interest rate had remained constant at
4% for pension funds since October 1969. The new regulatory framework
(called ‘Financieel Toetsingskader’ or FTK) stipulates that liabilities have to
be marked-to-market. In the international context, the FTK is one of the first
regulatory frameworks based on market valuation (see Ambachtsheer (2005)).
The current paper focuses on the Dutch situation as case in point of the
effects of market valuation.
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For unconditional pension rights, the market valuation principle leads
to increased transparency and accountability. If the market-value of assets
is smaller than the market-value of guaranteed liabilities, the pension fund
clearly has a solvency problem. For conditional pension rights, however, the
market valuation principle does not lead to higher transparency. The reason
is that the target asset level of the pension fund is no longer solely deter-
mined by the fund’s ambition regarding the pension arrangement it provides,
but also by the probability of reaching this ambition. Higher total funding
ratios (defined as total assets divided by the market value of both condi-
tional and unconditional pension rights) may in this case either reflect higher
asset levels, higher expected returns (e.g. higher interest rates), lower expected
indexation or a higher market price for risk taking (e.g. a higher spread
between government bonds and junk bonds). Compared to the fixed discount
rate method, taking account of changing expected returns probably improves
transparency, but this is more than offset by the counterintuitive fact that
worsening indexation perspectives, which are clearly not in the interest of
the pension fund’s participants, also result in higher total funding ratios. If
pension fund policy is primarily geared towards reaching high total funding
ratios (due to for instance regulation or accounting rules), market valuation
of conditional rights might even give rise to perverse incentives for pension
funds as policies resulting in a certain but low level of indexation lead to
higher total funding ratios than policies with – from the perspective of the
participants – better but uncertain indexation outcomes.
In addition, there is a widespread fear – typically found with pension
fund boards – that market valuation using the actual term structure of inter-
est rates leads to excessive volatility in funding ratios. If regulators impose
solvency requirements in terms of these market-based funding ratios, contri-
bution rates may become much more volatile. For pension fund boards, this
could mean tougher negotiations with the sponsor of the pension scheme,
and a larger frequency of bad news messages, caused by downward spikes
in the discount rate. In addition, from a macroeconomic point of view, it is
not desirable that contribution levels will be raised in periods with decreasing
interest rates as these periods are also likely to reflect less favorable economic
conditions.
In order to circumvent these problems, the FTK allows pension funds to
use a smoothed or fixed discount rate to determine annual contribution levels,
even though solvency is always to be determined by the prevailing risk-free
term structure of interest rates. Moreover, the solvency rules apply to guar-
anteed (in practice nominal) pension rights only.1
1 In addition pension funds are required to assess their long-run perspectives and risks peri-
odically in a ‘Continuity Analysis’. This provides additional insights in e.g. the indexation
quality of the pension plan.
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Using a simulation model for the Dutch pension sector, this paper analyzes
to what extent market valuation indeed leads to higher contribution volatility.
We first investigate the impact of the market based solvency rules by com-
paring a pre-FTK version of the model with an FTK-compatible one, both
using a fixed discount rate to determine contributions. Then, several alterna-
tives are presented where the market valuation principle is also applied to the
contribution policy and the real funding ratio. Our findings suggest that the
consequences of introducing market based solvency rules are fairly small if a
fixed rate is continued to be used for calculating contributions. Fully market
based contribution policies that ignore the conditionality of indexation lead
to much more volatility and substantial frontloading of pension costs. This
frontloading (and part of the volatility) can be precluded by adding a fixed
mark-up to the discount rate. Volatility can be further reduced by substan-
tially increasing the duration of assets. Smoothing is not to be recommended
as volatility remains relatively high, whereas it may lead to undesirable inertia
in responding to persistent interest rate changes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly the Dutch
pension system and the regulation of pension funds. Section 3 provides infor-
mation on Palmnet, an aggregate asset and liability model for the Dutch
pension sector. Section 4 introduces the policy alternatives that we evaluate.
Section 5 presents the stochastic simulation results, taking explicit account
of the fact that bond yields, returns on stock investments and inflation out-
comes are highly uncertain and may progress according to various scenarios.
Section 6 contains a discussion of the results and draws conclusions.
2 THE DUTCH PENSION SYSTEM: PENSION FUND POLICY, REGULATION
AND SUPERVISION
The pension system in the Netherlands is characterized by three layers or
pillars. The pay-as-you-go financed state pension (AOW) constitutes the first
pillar. On top of that, over 90% of employees save compulsory for retirement
through their employer.2 The employer makes contributions on behalf of its
employees to a pension fund.3 These retirement savings are capital funded.
All other private pension arrangements form the third pillar.
Pension funds play an important role in the Dutch pension system. Total
pension fund assets are around C 700 billion (or 130% of gdp) ranking the
Netherlands among the highest in the world. The more than 700 pension
2 This number is quite high compared to many other developed countries. See Van Els et al.
(2007) for a discussion.
3 Some employers do not have a pension fund but have a direct agreement with a life insurer.
About 10% of Dutch employees build up their pension this way. These retirement plans are
primarily of the DC type.
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funds range from very small company funds to large industry-wide funds.
There are very few (5%) defined contribution pension (DC) plans, most of
them collective. The vast majority (85%) of pension fund members are in a
conditional defined benefit (DB) pension scheme, with pension rights based
on career average salary payments. This typical DB scheme offers a nominal
guarantee as a fraction of current and past wage levels, whereas indexation
and pension contributions may fluctuate over time. Indexation is conditional
upon a discretionary decision by the pension board. In practice, full indexa-
tion with respect to either wage or price inflation – depending on the terms
of the pension contract – will be given if the funding ratio is high enough.
Only about 3% of the pension fund participants still build up pension rights
linked to their final salary.
The rules of regulation of pension funds have been laid down in the new
Pension Act that has been put into force as of 2007 (replacing the old Pen-
sion and Savings Funds Act from 1952). The Pension Act is accompanied
by a new supervisory regime, the FTK (acronym of the Dutch term ‘Finan-
cieel ToetsingsKader’). Key elements of the new regime are market valuation
– with respect to both assets and liabilities – and risk-based supervision. An
important feature of the FTK is the sharp distinction between guaranteed
(in practice nominal) pension rights and conditional ones (in practice indexa-
tion).4 No specific rules are imposed with respect to the investment policy of
the fund (the ‘prudent person principle’), though more risk taking leads to
higher required capital buffers.
The funding regulation in the FTK consists of three elements. First,
guaranteed rights (or accrued benefit obligations) are discounted using the
risk-free term structure of interest rates and should be fully funded. If – in
case of a nominal guarantee – the nominal funding ratio falls below 105%,
the pension fund reports immediately to the supervisor, De Nederlandsche
Bank (DNB, the Dutch central bank). In reporting, the fund should make
clear how it will restore the funding ratio to a level above this minimum
within at most three years. Second, a pension fund needs to have a solvency
buffer on top of the level of nominal liabilities reflecting the riskiness of the
assets. The buffer is specified by a target funding ratio that is such that the
probability of underfunding (a nominal funding ratio below 100%) within a
year is at most 2.5%. If the funding ratio falls below this level, the supervisor
4 Especially under an average earnings system this distinction is important for members as
inflation does not only matter during retirement, but also during the active working career.
Van Els et al. (2004) show that participants value pension security a lot. See also Van Rooij
et al. (2007). However, hardly any pension fund gives guarantees on future indexation. The
requirement to be permanently fully funded, where liabilities are measured against the pre-
vailing risk-free real yield curve, makes these pension plans extremely hard to handle (Bikker
and Vlaar (2007)). Therefore, it is argued that the regulatory and supervisory regime should
be adjusted to better reflect real obligations (see e.g. Van Ewijk and Teulings (2007)).
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requires a recovery plan specifying the pension fund’s actions directed to
reach the target funding ratio within maximal fifteen years. Third, any condi-
tionality in pension rights should be communicated clearly and consistently.
If that is the case, no formal funding rules are prescribed for the conditional
pension rights, except that there must be consistency between pension fund
policy, communicated ambitions, and actual indexation.
Under the FTK the cost-effective contribution level contains four elements:
costs of guaranteed pension rights, administrative costs, costs of conditional
rights, and costs to build up the required solvency buffer. To calculate these
costs, pension funds may either use the prevailing yield curve or expected
returns, a smoothed version of these interest rates or returns using a smooth-
ing period of at most 10 years, or a fixed value reflecting long-run expected
returns (all up to certain prescribed limits). Whatever the method chosen,
actual pension contributions generally need to be higher if the solvency buffer
is too low (as part of the recovery plan) and can be lower if the funding ratio
is high enough to ensure both conditional and unconditional pension rights
without endangering the solvency position of the pension fund.
3 THE PALMNET MODEL
We use the Palmnet model to evaluate the key results of different pension
fund policies in terms of the expected distribution of pension contributions
and indexation cuts. Palmnet, an acronym for P ension asset and liability
model for the Netherlands, is an ALM model in the spirit of those used by
many pension funds to govern their strategic decisions. Although an inten-
sive use of ALM models is encouraged as a result of the new regulation, the
view that stochastic models are an invaluable tool for pension funds has long
been recognized. Wilkie (1986, 1995) and Boender (1997) provide early exam-
ples for the UK and the Netherlands, respectively. Within Palmnet, inflation,
interest rates and stock market returns are stochastic variables. Interest rates
and inflation are based on a three factor affine term structure model (Vlaar
(2006)). The factors represent the short-term interest rate, the expected infla-
tion rate, and risk aversion in the bond market.5 Stock market returns are
log-normally distributed, with an expectation equal to three percentage points
on top of the prevailing five-year interest rate and an annual volatility of
15%. These parameter choices are common in ALM studies and fit within the
boundaries prescribed by the FTK.
5 The model is arbitrage-free, incorporates the mutual interaction between interest rates and
inflation, produces asymmetry in the levels of interest rates and inflation (no negative nominal
rates), and stationary factors (necessary for long-run simulations). The model provides plausible
values for both first and second moments of (changes in) interest rates with maturities up to
sixty years.
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The Palmnet model is fully FTK-consistent.6 The nominal term structure
is used to calculate nominal liabilities and the nominal funding ratio. The
liabilities are derived from the pension rights of pension plan participants
divided in 80 age cohorts starting from the age of 21 until 100 years. New
pension rights are built up in line with demographic projections of the devel-
opments in the total Dutch population from Statistics Netherlands and labor
market projections from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analy-
sis (or CPB) taken from Van Ewijk et al. (2000). Existing pension rights are
reduced due to mortality and conceivably increased due to indexation. The
current average duration of nominal liabilities is about 16 years. By explic-
itly modeling the cohorts and calculating the developments in pension rights
using demographic trends, the effects of ageing are automatically taken into
account. The ratio of pension liabilities versus the contribution base (about
60% of the total gross wage sum7) is projected to almost double from just
over five to nine or ten. Thereby, in steering the funding ratio, indexation cuts
gain importance relative to contribution steps.
Besides the nominal funding ratio, Palmnet (unlike the FTK) also uses
the real funding ratio. This real funding ratio can either be based on a fixed
discount rate (usually equal to the expected real return of the asset portfolio),
or the real term structure of interest rates (possibly smoothed and/or aug-
mented by a fixed mark-up reflecting the conditionality in indexation). The
same discount rate is used to calculate contributions, thereby applying the
same valuation for new and existing pension rights. Contributions and index-
ation depend on both the nominal funding ratio reflecting the ability to guar-
antee the unconditional rights, and the real funding ratio that is relevant for
the indexation ambition. If the solvency position of the pension fund is insuf-
ficient the rules for the nominal funding ratio are binding and otherwise –
in case of sufficient funding – policy is determined by the real funding ratio
to live up to the indexation ambitions. Table 1 reports the standard policy
ladders used in Palmnet.
The critical nominal target funding ratio of 121% reflects the minimal
solvency position needed to make sure that the probability of becoming insol-
vent a year later is at most 2.5%. This value is based on the assumption of
an investment mix with 50% bonds (average duration 6 years), and 50% stocks,
which is typical for Dutch pension funds. The expected (geometric mean) real
return on this portfolio, used to calculate the real discount rates is 2.88%, given
an equilibrium short-term interest rate of 4.0% and equilibrium price and wage
6 Van Rooij et al. (2004) provide an extensive description of the first, pre-FTK version of
Palmnet, in which the nominal funding ratio had no impact on pension fund policy.
7 Pension contributions are levied only on wages above a statutory exemption. This ‘franchise’
is generally linked to the level of the AOW benefit.
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TABLE 1 – STANDARD POLICY LADDERS USED IN PALMNET
Funding ratio (in %) Indexation
Below 105 (nominal) No indexation
105 (nominal)–105 (real) Indexation cut declines linearly
105 (real)–110 (real) Full indexation, no compensation of previous cuts
Above 110 (real) Full indexation, with compensation of previous cuts
Contributions (% of the contribution base)
Below 105 (nominal) Based on a 3-year recovery plan given current
interest rates, assuming no indexation; maximum
increase 5 percentage points per annum
Below 121 (nominal) Based on 15-year recovery plan; no reduction;
maximum increase 3 percentage points
121 (nominal) – 110 (real) Actual cost; maximum annual change 3 percentage
points
110 (real) – 140 (real) Linear reduction of contribution to zero; maximum
annual change 3 percentage points
140 (real) – 175 (real) Zero contribution (or 3 percentage points lower
than last year)
Above 175 (real) Contribution restitution
Note: Nominal funding ratios are based on the actual nominal term structure of interest rates.
Real funding ratios, 15-year recovery plans and contributions are either based on a fixed discount
rate equal to the expected long-run real return of a typical Dutch pension fund (2.88%) or on the
actual real interest rate, usually augmented by a mark-up to reflect the mean difference between
the expected return on a representative portfolio and that of a liability-replicating one.
inflation rates of 2.0% and 3.0%, respectively.8 These numbers are generally
considered plausible and are in line with FTK-regulations.
Palmnet simulations run from 2003 (the data have been calibrated using
end of 2002 figures) to 2100 to show long-term and short-term effects of
various pension fund policies. Note that the starting point reflects a situation
with low solvency and thus the short-term effects are indicative of the pol-
icy steps needed in a situation in which the pension funds are under stress.
In this paper, we focus on the long-term effects of various policy alternatives
represented by distributions of the nominal and real funding ratio, contribu-
tions and indexation cuts as well as a measure of total contribution volatility.
These distributions are derived from 10.000 Monte Carlo simulations.
4 POLICY ALTERNATIVES
As described in section 2, market valuation in the FTK has two dimen-
sions. First, solvency rules under the FTK are always based on the prevailing
8 In order to limit the number of stochastic shocks, we use a fixed markup of 1.0 percentage
point over expected price inflation to calculate wage inflation.
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market interest rates. Second, pension funds can use market rates to deter-
mine their contribution policy, though using a fixed discount rate (here
termed actuarial discounting) is also allowed. The six different policy alter-
natives presented below reflect both dimensions.
4.1 Pre-FTK
The first alternative is a benchmark scenario that is not FTK-compatible,
where contribution policy only depends on the real funding ratio based on a
fixed discount rate. The fixed discount rate is 2.88%, representing the expected
real investment return of the pension fund. In this pre-FTK variant the nom-
inal guarantees are not given much attention. Contribution policy is only
geared towards achieving the real ambition. In the simulations, this is mod-
elled by ignoring the first step in the contribution policy ladder in Table 1
(so no three-year recovery plans), and replacing the nominal target in steps
two and three by a real target of 105%. Fifteen-year recovery plans are based
on the same fixed discount rate.
4.2 FTK-Actuarial
In the second alternative, pension funds continue to use a fixed discount rate,
but enter the FTK-world where nominal funding ratios trigger recovery plans.
The policy ladders presented in Table 1 are in full operation. Regarding 3-year
recovery plans, expected returns are based on the assumption that current
interest rates remain constant. Fifteen-year recovery plans are based on the
long-run expected returns.
4.3 Risk-free Fair Value
The third alternative, ‘Risk-free fair value’, applies market valuation to the
real value of liabilities. That is, including indexation. The problem in a mar-
ket valuation context that uncertainty regarding indexation should lead to
a higher discount rate, and thereby lower liabilities, is circumvented by the
(wrong) assertion that indexation is certain. The simulated term structure
of real interest rates is used for determining the contribution level, the real
funding ratio and the expected return in case of recovery plans. Both 3-year
and 15-year recovery plans are based on current interest rates.
4.4 Augmented: Fair Value with Mark-up
The augmented alternative starts from the risk-free fair value alternative but
puts a mark-up on the discount rate used for valuing the indexed liabilities.
This represents the conditionality embedded in the pension rights: Indexation
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is conditional on the financial situation of the fund and thus deserves a risk
premium when discounted, which is the markup. The level of the mark-up is
the average difference in the expected return between the actual asset port-
folio and a liability-replicating one. Notice that this way of calculating the
mark-up is not market based as it reintroduces expected returns in the dis-
count rate. The fixed mark-up is however preferred to a market-based one,
as from a participant’s point of view it is strange to give pension fund spon-
sors a bonus (in the form of higher discount rates) for a lower probability of
indexation.
4.5 Augmented and Smoothed
The FTK allows for smoothed interest rates or expected returns to be used
for determining the contribution policy. Therefore, in this alternative the
10-year average of the real term structure plus mark-up is used to compute
the real funding ratio and contributions.
4.6 Augmented and Duration Matched
The interest-rate sensitivity of the nominal funding ratio is driven by the mis-
match between assets and liabilities. As explained in section 3, nominal lia-
bilities typically have a duration of about 16 years under market valuation
whereas the assets typically have an average duration of only 3 years.9 There-
fore, the last alternative is one in which the average duration of the assets
held by the pension fund is increased to 16 years, matching that of the lia-
bilities. This is modeled by increasing the duration of the bond portfolio to
32 years, as stock market returns are assumed to be uncorrelated with inter-
est rate shocks.
5 RESULTS
This section presents the performance of the alternatives depicted in section 4,
as measured by the level and volatility of contribution, average cut in indexa-
tion, nominal and real funding ratio. In discussing the outcomes, we will refer
to the graphical output of the simulations in Figures 1–6. The information in
the graphs is quite dense. Therefore, we start by providing a detailed explana-
tion of the results presented in Figure 1. This will facilitate the interpretation
of the outcomes documented in the remainder of this section.
Panel A (top left) shows the development over time of the entire distri-
bution of the nominal funding ratio. The nominal funding ratio is always
9 The average 3-year duration follows from the assumptions regarding a 50% bond-50%
equity portfolio with an average bond duration of 6 years and no correlation between equity
and bond price shocks.
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Figure 1 – Simulation results pre-FTK, actuarial real discount rate of 2.88%
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Figure 2 – Simulation results for a standard pension fund, actuarial real discount rate of 2.88%
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Figure 3 – Simulation results under risk-free market valuation
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Figure 4 – Simulation results under market valuation, augmented to reflect portfolio returns
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Figure 5 – Simulation results under market valuation with 10-year interest rate smoothing
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Figure 6 – Simulation results under market valuation with duration matching
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computed using the nominal term structure of interest rates. The solid line
gives the average value of the funding ratio while the shaded areas present
the range of outcomes for 60%, 80% and 95% of the simulations. Hence, one
can derive the percentiles of the distributions from the edges of the shaded
areas. For example, the 2.5-percentile is represented by the lower edge of the
95%-area and the 97.5-percentile by the top edge of the 95%-area. Likewise,
the 10 and 90 percentiles are represented by the lower and top edge of the
80%-area, respectively.
Panels B (top right) and C (bottom left) show the distribution of the
real funding ratio (discount rate mentioned in parentheses) and contributions,
respectively, with the same representation of the average and percentiles as in
panel A. Panel D (bottom right) shows the dispersion of the cut in per period
benefits due to incomplete indexation for the average retiree. It is defined as
the difference in percentage points between the actual pension benefit and
a benefit that has been fully indexed to wage developments. Two additional
lines are included to represent the benefit cuts compared to a wage-indexed
pension benefit of an inflation-proof pension and a nominal pension, respec-
tively. The ‘inflation-proof’ line expresses the benefit cuts that eliminate the
real wage improvement (1% per year), but leave the purchasing power unaf-
fected. The ‘nominal’ line expresses the impact of the maximum cumulated
indexation cuts in an average inflation environment (3% wage inflation per
year).
The four panels in the Figures represent the four key variables in the
analysis: the nominal funding ratio, the real funding ratio, contributions and
indexation cuts. Table 2 shows the mean and 10% worst results for these key
variables after 5, 25 and 50, years, as well as the standard deviation of the
annual changes in contributions. We now discuss the results of the alterna-
tives in the same order as presented in Table 2 and section 4.
5.1 Pre-FTK
The simulation outcomes for the pre-FTK alternative are shown in Figure 1
and in the first line of Table 2. Most of the time, the pension contract is quite
well affordable and very generous. In the very long-run, the mean contribu-
tion rate is only about 5% (current pension contributions are about 15% of
the gross wage sum at the macro level) while the average benefit cut is only
6%. These positive results are caused by the asymmetric policy ladders used.
Negative shocks to the funding ratio lead to extra contributions and/or index-
ation cuts. Positive shocks only lead to a gradual decrease in contributions
while indexation is maximized at 3% on average. Consequently, the average
funding ratios increase gradually, far beyond the target funding ratios deemed
necessary.
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TABLE 2 – AVERAGE AND WORST-CASE SIMULATION RESULTS FOR KEY
VARIABLES (IN %)
Contribution Benefit cuta Funding ratiob
Level Vol.c Nominal Real
Average results
After . . . years 5 25 50 5 25 50 5 25 50 5 25 50
1 Pre-FTK 15 10 6 1.31 3 7 6 134 151 160 101 117 124
2 FTK-Actuarial 15 11 6 1.38 3 7 6 133 150 160 101 116 124
3 Risk-free Fair value 20 9 3 2.54 5 4 3 140 175 178 83 111 115
4 Augmented 15 11 6 1.72 3 6 5 132 151 159 98 116 124
5 Smoothed 12 12 6 1.49 2 9 6 123 149 159 100 114 124
6 Duration matched 13 8 3 1.48 2 5 4 139 152 163 107 120 130
10 % worst-case results
After . . . years 5 25 50 5 25 50 5 25 50 5 25 50
1 Pre-FTK 18 17 17 7 23 23 106 108 111 84 90 92
2 FTK-Actuarial 15 16 15 7 24 22 105 109 112 83 90 92
3 Risk-free Fair value 22 26 24 8 14 10 111 133 134 65 83 85
4 Augmented 19 20 19 6 23 21 105 113 116 78 86 89
5 Smoothed 16 20 19 5 27 23 98 111 114 83 87 90
6 Duration matched 17 17 16 5 19 19 115 116 119 88 92 94
Notes: a Total benefits relative to total benefits in case of guaranteed indexation; b Assets
expressed as a percentage of the required pension provisions in, respectively, nominal and real
terms. In the first two variants, the pension provisions in real terms are calculated using a
fixed discount rate of 2.88%; in the other variants the actual real interest rate is used, possibly
smoothed and/or augmented by a risk mark-up. The nominal funding ratio is always computed
using the actual nominal term structure of interest rates; c Negative contributions are set to zero
when computing volatility (standard deviation in percentage points).
The probability of receiving a retirement benefit that ends up significantly
below an inflation-indexed pension is small in the pension fund policy under
consideration (which includes the ambition of wage indexation). In bad sce-
narios however, the results can still be quite painful with contribution levels
of over 17% and benefit cuts of over 23% of the wage indexed pension bene-
fits in the 2.5% worst case outcomes. Moreover, the volatility of pension con-
tributions equals 1.31%, implying that the level of pension contributions may
change quickly.
Although the results look quite favorable, it should be realized that the
simulations are based on the assumption that the structure and parameters of
all stochastic processes are known. In reality this is of course never the case,
and history has shown that the standard remedy for this uncertainty – using
conservative assumptions – were easily be ignored by pension funds. If overly
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optimistic assumptions are used for too long, participating in the fund may
become unattractive for new members, thereby endangering the continuity of
the fund. As continuity is one of the essential assumptions in the simulations,
the results shown may be too optimistic.
5.2 FTK-Actuarial
Under the FTK, the risk of being too optimistic is limited to a large extent
as full funding of at least the guaranteed pension liabilities, measured at mar-
ket rates, is always aimed at. Whereas under the pre-FTK regime too high
return assumptions could lead to sustained underfunding, the market-based
nominal funding requirements under FTK forces pension funds to realism.
Too high discount rates to calculate contributions and real funding ratios lead
to a higher probability of nominal funding ratios below 105% which have to
result in more aggressive adjustment plans. On the other hand, the focus in
solvency regulation on guaranteed (nominal) rights only, might lead to worse
indexation outcomes, even though standard contribution policy should take
indexation into account.
Comparing the results in Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2, it seems that the
impact of the FTK is only minor if the fixed discount rate is maintained.
Despite the focus of the FTK on nominal obligations, the indexation result
is very similar in most cases, and even slightly better in the worst scenarios.
The latter result is due to the more aggressive adjustment plans when the
FTK becomes binding in case of nominal underfunding. This is reflected
in the contribution results. The 97.5 percentile for contributions under FTK
(Figure 2) is about 22%, whereas it is less than 20% in the pre-FTK ver-
sion (Figure 1). On average, the contribution results are very similar, though
slightly more volatile (1.38% against 1.31%). This seems to be an acceptable
price for the greater security in guaranteeing unconditional pension rights.
Moreover, the simulations show that there is not much conflict between the
real ambitions of pension funds and the regulatory framework focusing on
nominal obligations.
In the equilibrium situation, the probability of a real funding ratio below
100% is about 1 in 5. Because indexation is conditional, this does not immedi-
ately constitute a problem from a regulatory point of view. A 100% real fund-
ing ratio is still well above the 121% nominal target ratio (which on average
equals a real funding ratio of 91%) and the pension fund sets the contribution
on the cost effective level (but it will not fully index annual wage inflation).
For the nominal funding ratio we find that the probability of a deficit (fund-
ing ratio < 105%) is around 5%. This number is higher than the 2.5% men-
tioned in the Pension Act for two reasons. First, the target nominal funding
ratio of 121% is calculated such that the probability to decrease within a year
from the target value to 100% (and not 105%) is just 2.5%. Second, once a
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pension fund comes into the danger zone it has 15 years to recover and reach
a funding ratio of more than 121%. Clearly, the probability of a fall below
the 100% within the recovery period exceeds the 2.5%. In practice, the actual
nominal funding ratio can be expected to be lower than the target ratio of
121% in 15–20% of the years.
5.3 Risk-free Fair Value
The risk-free fair valuealternative,where real liabilities are alsomarked-to-market
ignoring the conditionality, does a very bad job for the pension fund: pension
contributions are on average 20% in year 5, and contribution volatility is almost
twice its level in the fixed discount rate world. In the long-run, the huge implicit
buffers, due to the on average very low discount rate (about 1.7% for the most
relevant maturities), reduce the average contribution rate to only 3%, but in the
10%worst scenarios contributions exceed24%.This largedispersionandvolatility
in contribution rates is due to the volatility of the real interest rates (about 47
basis points for the relevantmaturities)whichmake the cost-effective contribution
level extremely volatile. Indeed, contribution volatility and dispersion are entirely
due to changes in the cost-effective contribution level. Shortfall contributions are
hardly ever necessary. Consequently, changing the asset mix towards a liability
replicating portfolio will not reduce the volatility.
The only aspect in this scenario performing well is indexation. Both the
average cuts and the worst case indexation results are substantially better in
this risk free scenario. The price paid for ignoring the benefits of the equity
risk premium is however large, both for the generation that has to build up
the implicit buffer and for those that happen to live in an era of low real
interest rates.
5.4 Augmented: Fair Value with Mark-up
In the augmented pension fund policy alternative, real interest rates are
increased by a fixed mark-up, reflecting the conditionality in the indexation
promise. The mark-up substantially reduces the problem of frontloading and
contribution volatility. Compared to the fixed discount rate world, volatil-
ity remains relatively high though (1.72% compared to 1.38%, respectively).
There are three reasons for this higher volatility. First, changes in the real
term structure of interest rates affect the level of the cost-effective pension
contribution level (annual volatility 1.80%). In fact, the 95% percent inter-
val bands of the cost-effective contribution level range from 8% to 22% of
gross wages, where in the actuarial world the cost-effective contribution level
is more or less fixed (apart from gradual changes within the composition of
the labor force and life expectancy projections). Second, as the real funding
ratio is calculated using actual real interest rates instead of a fixed discount
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rate, the volatility of the real funding ratio increases (from 10.7 to 12.4%).
This has an impact on both indexation and contribution policies (Table 1).
Third, in the 15-year recovery plans, expected returns are determined by cur-
rent interest rates as opposed to a fixed rate. As the duration of the assets is
much lower than the one of liabilities, pension funds are most likely to enter
recovery plans when interest rates are low. Expected returns are lower in that
case, leading to more aggressive policies under market valuation. As interest
rates are in fact mean reverting (though the equilibrium level might change
over time), the effective recovery time will consequently be lower than 15 years
under market valuation on average.
Apart from the higher volatility, comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 2
reveals that the difference between a fixed and a market-based discount factor
are particularly apparent for the 80 and 90 percentiles. Under a fixed rate
regime, the contribution level for these percentiles hardly ever exceeds the
cost-effective contribution of about 15%. In the market-based regime, the
cost-effective contribution in the 20% and 10% worst scenarios is higher
(about 17% and 19%, respectively) but moreover shortfall contributions are
higher as well as one does not rely on the mean reversion in interest rates. For
the 97.5 percentile the difference between the two is much less as under three-
year recovery plans both methods use the same return assumptions (based on
current interest rates). Also the mean results are very similar though the aver-
age contribution level is somewhat higher in the market valuation case due
to the worse timing of contributions (contributions are high when expected
returns are low). On the other hand, the more aggressive recovery plans make
the performance in terms of indexation slightly better. The implicit costs of
market valuation mainly lie in the increased volatility of the contribution rate
and a higher probability of painfully high contributions. These characteristics
are not in the interest of sponsors and active pension fund participants.
5.5 Augmented and Smoothed
Figure 5 displays the simulation results when real interest rates (plus mark-
up) are smoothed over a 10-year period. The annual volatility of the dis-
count rate reduces from 47 to only 13 basis points, and, as a result, the con-
tribution volatility reduces to 1.49%. The main problem with this method
becomes clear from the top right and bottom left panels in Figure 5. As
interest rates were very high in the beginning of the nineties, the 10-year-
smoothed rates used to calculate the real funding ratio were still quite high at
the end of 2002. Consequently, despite the drop in assets after the stock mar-
ket crash and the declining interest rates, the financial situation of the fund
still looked good. Therefore, in the policy variant the contribution rate even
declines in 2003! A few years later, the problematic financial situation became
transparent and firm adjustments had to be made. Therefore, the indexation
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result is somewhat worse for this fund initially. In all, the results seem to indi-
cate that smoothing inherits the worst of two worlds. It reacts too slow to per-
sistent rate declines but gives more volatility than a conservative fixed rate.
5.6 Augmented and Duration Matched
One important reason why market valuation results in contribution rates that
are both more volatile and on average higher is that pension fund liabilities
are more interest rate sensitive than their assets are. Consequently, pension
funds are most likely to be in deficit if interest rates are low (the opposite is
true if a fixed discount rate is used). Therefore, contributions are likely to be
high if expected returns are low. In order to improve upon this inefficient tim-
ing of contribution investments, Figure 6 shows simulation results for a pen-
sion fund that eliminates the duration mismatch between assets and liabilities.
Indeed, the results look much more favorable, both on average and in the
extremes. The average contribution level reduces in the long-run to only 3 to 4
percentage points and in 97.5% of all scenarios the contribution level is below
20%.10 More surprising is that the distribution of benefit cuts also compares
favorably to those in previous scenarios. A better duration match between
assets and nominal liabilities at the same time improves results for indexa-
tion, even though long-term bonds are more inflation-sensitive than short-
term ones. This contrasts with the results by De Jong (2008) who finds that
5-year nominal bonds are preferred to 20-year ones. The main difference is
that De Jong analyzes a finite (20 years) horizon, whereas we consider an infi-
nite one. Although a positive inflation shock initially hurts more if long-term
bonds are held, in the long-run mean returns are not lower, as low returns in
one year are compensated by high returns later on.
There are at least three reasons for the relatively good results. First, with-
out the duration mismatch the probability of nominal deficits is much smaller.
Therefore, extreme contribution levels and indexation cuts are less likely.
Moreover, the nominal target funding ratio, based on the constraint of 2.5%
probability of underfunding, is reduced from 121% to 116%. Second, dura-
tion matching leads to a more efficient timing of contribution changes. For
this reason, the optimal duration of assets should even be much higher than
the one for liabilities (Vlaar (2005)). As the duration of liabilities increased
from 0 to about 16 by the introduction of the FTK, the optimal duration
of assets of Dutch pension funds has substantially increased. Indeed, most
pension funds are nowadays considering a duration increase for their assets,
though many want to wait till interest rates are at a higher level. Third, the
10 A very similar picture would result if an actuarial rate would be used instead, though the
higher duration mismatch would in that case lead to somewhat higher contribution volatility
and slightly less favorable indexation results.
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on average somewhat higher yield on a 32-year bond compared to the 6-year
one increases the expected portfolio return by 17 basis points. Therefore, the
mark-up on real interest rates to calculate contributions and the real funding
ratio was also increased to 1.38% points. This in turn reduces the volatility of
the cost-effective contribution level slightly (to 1.66%), but the resulting actual
contribution volatility remains 10 basis points higher than under a fixed rate.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The 2007 Pension Act has introduced market valuation of nominal, guaranteed
pension rights in the Netherlands. The current new supervisory practice (FTK) is
among the first regulatory frameworks worldwide focusing on market valuation
of pension liabilities. The step from actuarial to fair value accounting in calculat-
ing funding ratios has potentially a huge impact on pension fund policy.However,
the simulation results show that the FTK does not have major implications for
pension funds with conditional indexation. There is an increase in contribution
volatility due to those occasions in which market-valued nominal funding ratios
are binding. This increase is modest, however, because the FTK provides pen-
sion funds with the flexibility to set the pension contributions using a fixed dis-
count rate reflecting their long-term ambitions. At the same time, transparency
about guaranteed pension rights has increased; at any moment in time it is clear
whether the asset portfolio is sufficient to guarantee that nominal pension liabil-
ities can easily be transferred to a third party, if necessary. The relation between
market-valued funding ratios and the probability of indexation, though, is much
less transparent.
Market valuation of conditional pension liabilities, i.e. the indexation ambi-
tion of pension funds is problematic both from the viewpoint of transparency
and from an economic perspective. Under fair value, the market-value of pen-
sion liabilities increases with the likelihood of indexation, and as a conse-
quence the ratio between market-valued assets and total liabilities will, ceteris
paribus, be lower. Therefore, the total funding ratio is not informative about
the probability of indexation. Moreover, the simulation results show that if we
base pension fund policy on the risk-free market value of wage-linked pen-
sion rights, the volatility of contribution rates increases substantially and the
required huge, implicit buffers imply a heavy frontloading of pension costs.
This is due to the high volatility and generally low level of real interest rates.
The problems of frontloading and contribution volatility can be substantially
reduced by using a fixed mark-up over the actual real term structure of interest
rates in calculating the cost-effective contribution level and the real funding ratio.
Note that by including a mark-up related to the expected returns, although per-
mitted under the FTK-regulation, we deviate from the strict market-value world.
Compared to thefixed realdiscountapproach,however, volatilityof contributions
remains high. Interest rate smoothing, although reducing the volatility somewhat
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further, is not to be preferred as it reintroduces the risk of not reacting promptly
to a prolonged decrease in real interest rates.
Abetter remedy to reduce the contribution volatility is tomatch thedurationof
assets to the duration of liabilities. Although the resulting contribution volatility
is still higher than in the actuarial fixeddiscount rate approach in setting contribu-
tion levels, the performance in terms of cumulative benefit cuts and contribution
levels in average andworst-case scenario’s is clearly better. This is not somuch the
result of the slightly higher investment returns, although this adds to the attrac-
tiveness of the pension fund. Crucial factors are (1) the reduced probability of
nominal shortfalls as a result of the duration matching and (2) the improved tim-
ing of contribution rises. Moreover, the extension of the asset’s duration is also
attractive from a macroeconomic point of view as it increases the likelihood that
pension contributions are low (high) when interest rates are low (high). This way
the scope for countercyclical pension fund policies increases by supporting eco-
nomic growth in times that the economic situation is likely to be less favorable.
Unfortunately, it is not clear towhat extent large pension fundswill be able to pur-
sue this policy at present given the relatively limited size of the market for bonds
with long to very long maturities.
All in all, we can draw a number of conclusions from the simulation results in
this paper. First, potential benefits ofmarket valuation come at the price of higher
volatility of funding ratios and contributions. Second, the new Dutch regulatory
FTK framework for pension funds does not necessarily have much impact on
funds that pursue an indexationambition (conditional onadiscretionarydecision
of the pension fund Board). Third, a stronger focus in regulation on the real value
of the pension deal in combination with a strict application of market valuation
is unattractive because it leads to a very large frontloading of pension costs and
substantially higher contribution volatility. Fourth, it is optimal for pension funds
to increase the duration of the asset portfolio considerably.
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